PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Series: Nuclear and Reactor Constants

since 1971

Русский (РФ)

ISSN 2414-1038 (online)

JUSTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN HANDING DAMAGED FUEL AT THE KURSK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

EDN: ESFCBR

Authors & Affiliations

Lebedev S.S., Rozhdestvenskiy I.M.
N.A. Dollezhal Research & Development Institute of Power Engineering, Moscow, Russia

Lebedev S.S. – Engineer 2nd category. Contacts: 1, building 3, pl. Akademika Dollezhalya, Moscow, Russia, 107140. Tel.: +7 (499) 264-42-32; e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
Rozhdestvenskiy I.M. – Deputy Department Head, Group Head.

Abstract

One of the key objectives in the process of undertaking integrated measures aiming to decommission safely and effectively the Kursk NPP Phase I RBMK-1000 reactors is to implement the procedures for unloading spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the nuclear reactor core and transfer spent fuel assemblies (SFA) to the reactor SNF cooling pond. This pond is a temporary storage facility where spent fuel can be stored in conditions that ensure its safe cooling and isolation. After the spent fuel assemblies, including damaged SFAs, are unloaded and placed in the cooling pond, they will be transported, as the next stage, to a dedicated SNF storage facility. This process requires special attention and thorough preparations, since it includes handling of both standard fuel assemblies and damaged fuel assemblies, which require an individual handling approach. When inside the SNF storage facility, spent fuel assemblies are also stored in the cooling pond beneath the protective layer of water.
Justification of nuclear safety at all SFA handling stages requires a detailed analysis with all potential risks and hazards taken into account, and is an essential stage of activities to transfer fuel to the SNF storage facility. It is only provided that all required procedures are undertaken and the nuclear safety standards are observed that it can be said for certain that the process of fuel transfer to the SNF storage facility will proceed with no violations and as required by regulations.

Keywords
nuclear safety, effective neutron multiplication factor, Kursk NPP, damaged fuel assembly, cooling pond, SNF storage facility, precision code, Monte Carlo method

Article Text (PDF, in Russian)

References

UDC 621.039.58

Problems of Atomic Science and Technology. Series: Nuclear and Reactor Constants, 2025, no. 3, 3:8