PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Series: Nuclear and Reactor Constants

since 1971

Русский (РФ)

ISSN 2414-1038 (online)

COMPUTATIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR USING PASSIVE FEEDBACK DEVICES IN THE BR-1200 REACTOR

EDN: JVHZHA

Authors & Affiliations

Vologina S.A., Zhirnov A.P., Ivaniuta A.N., Moiseev A.V., Proukhin A.V., Stremin A.V., Palatova M.I.
N.A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering, Moscow, Russia

Vologina S.A. – Engineer. Contacts: 1, bldg. 3, Akademika Dollezhalya pl., Moscow, Russia. E-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
Zhirnov A.P. – Head of Department.
Ivaniuta A.N. – Head of Group.
Moiseev A.V. – Scientific Supervisor of the BREST-OD-300 Project, Cand. Sci. (Phys.-Math.).
Proukhin A.V. – Chief Expert.
Stremin A.V. – Lead Engineer.
Palatova M.I. – Engineer.

Abstract

Large-scale development of nuclear power that meets the requirements for natural safety, nonproliferation, environmental neutrality and cost effectiveness requires building a large competitive commercial power unit based on the BREST-OD reactor technology (BR-1200 reactor facility). One of the key objectives in developing a large reactor facility with a fast neutron lead-cooled reactor is justification of safety. An efficient way to improve the safety of the BR-1200 facility is to use, as part of considering postulated beyond design basis accidents, a reactivity impact tool that ensures passive introduction of negative reactivity. This requires justifying the availability and efficiency of passive feedback devices (PFD) as the beyond design basis accident control tool. Their efficiency should be sufficient to preclude fuel cladding melting. Development and justification of the PFD efficiency is an essential stage in the BR-1200 safety justification. Two PFD designs have been developed for the efficiency analysis: installed in the side reflector and in the fuel assemblies of central subzone. The PFD operation is based on the passive principle when the absorbing material is immersed under its own weight at a decrease in the action of the hydrodynamic (buoyancy) force from the lead coolant upward flow. PFDs provide the respective power reduction during a beyond design basis accident by the negative reactivity introduction in case of PFDs installed in the central subzone FA or a greater neutron leakage in case of PFDs installed in the side reflector. This paper presents a computational analysis of the most conservative postulated scenarios of beyond design basis accidents. The results of calculating a similar scenario without operation of passive feedback devices are given as a demonstration of the PFD efficiency.

Keywords
passive feedback device, BR-1200 reactor, beyond design basis accident, lead coolant, temperature, fuel assembly, safety justification, EUCLID, transients

Article Text (PDF, in Russian)

References

UDC 621.039.58

Problems of Atomic Science and Technology. Series: Nuclear and Reactor Constants, 2025, no. 4, 4:9